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Santrauka. Straipsnyje analizuojamos Jacques Derrida ir Jameso Tully multikultūralizmo ir pripaži-
nimo politikos teorinės sampratos. Aptariamos Derrida dekonstrukcijos panaudojimo galimybės apmąstant 
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žinimo politiką. Jameso Tully vitgenšteiniška moderniojo konstiucionalizmo kritikos samprata analizuo-
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Introduction
One of the key features of post-industrial 
societies in Europe and North America has 
been cultural diversity. Ever since the 1970s, 
multiculturalism has become official policy 
in many European and North American so-
cieties. In Canada, a country where the term 
was originally invented, multiculturalism 
is both its official state policy as well as the 
key element of Canadian national identity 
(Dupont & Lemarchand 2001; 310). Today, 
multiculturalism is almost taken for granted 
in the most advanced Western European and 
North American societies, even though after 
9/11 certain aspects of multiculturalism, es-
pecially as far as the radicalism of some Mus-
lim religious communities are concerned, 
have been put to question. Ever since the 
1960s, cultural diversity and multicultural-
ism have also been closely linked to a vari-
ety of social and cultural movements such as 
feminism, civil rights activism, the ecologist 
movement, and animal rights activism as well 
as to alternative values which emphasize soli-
darity rather than competition, heterogene-
ity and difference rather than homogeneity 
and uniformity, world-disclosing rather than 
world-controlling values. Consequently, the 
modern idea of progress and the supreme 
value of the “West” have been put to ques-
tion while other cultures and identities claim 
equal rights and political recognition. These 
cultural changes contain a moral dimension 
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as well. The proponents of multiculturalism 
argue that multiculturalism is impossible 
without a certain ethos, the ethos of increasing 
sensitivity to the other. The followers of Em-
manuel Levinas have been instrumental in 
recent theoretical attempts to conceptualize 
cultural diversity and multiculturalism (e.g. 
Visker 2003 & Valevičius 1998). The criti-
cal questions posed recently have been about 
the extent and scope of inclusion and the 
recognition of differences. That is to say, to 
what extent are modern politics and modern 
constitutionalism able to cope when faced 
with radical differences and heterogeneity? 
How far are modern politics, with their poli-
cies and institutions, able to accommodate 
vast cultural diversity and irreducible other-
ness? There are at least two different points 
of view when addressing these questions: on 
the one hand, there is ethical sensitivity and 
care towards the Other; on the other hand, 
there is the sphere of politics and law which 
most of all is concerned with social cohesion, 
peace and order of a given society as a whole. 
The first is the realm of ethos; the second can 
be called the domain of nomos. Ethos refers 
to the individuality and singularity of our 
claims for recognition whereas nomos always 
aims to be universal as it addresses and rep-
resents the whole of society. 
In this essay I will explore how these two 
theoretical aspects of multiculturalism are 
addressed in the works of Jacques Derrida 
and James Tully. Both of these social theo-
rists are instructive in our attempt to theo-
retically conceptualize multiculturalism and 
the politics of recognition. Thus the main 
issue to be considered is as follows: how do 
Derrida and Tully resolve the tension be-
tween the ethos of difference and the nomos 
of universal justice? Although James Tully 
and Jacques Derrida, as political philoso-
phers, are very different, they nonetheless 
share important similarities. One of them 
rests in their philosophical critique of the 
dominant language of the modern political 
life of privileged white men.
Deconstruction and the politics  
of recognition 
Jacques Derrida’s philosophical attempt 
to addresses the issue of political authority 
has made a lasting impact on legal and politi-
cal theory (Goodrich et al 2008). One of the 
most influential of Derrida’s essays on legal 
theory is his 1989 lecture “Force of Law: The 
Mystical Foundation of Authority”, which 
was originally delivered at Cardozo Law 
School in New York (Derrida 1992). Simi-
lar to his other works, “Force of Law” should 
be read in light of his notion of deconstruc-
tion, which determines both the content 
and form of the essay. With the risk of gross 
simplification, deconstruction can be defined 
as an approach which seeks to destabilize all 
forms of opposition in order to disclose their 
founding possibility through impossibility, 
that is by defining possibility as its impos-
sibility (Derrida 1996; 82). Deconstruction 
aims to highlight the very foundation of any 
cognitive discourse, thus trying to reveal the 
transcendent, i.e. that which is beyond. This 
claim has an affinity with traditional meta-
physics, as the notion of transcendence, orig-
inating with Aristotle, has been a key element 
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in any philosophical discussion over the na-
ture of metaphysics. However, the difference 
between Derrida’s notion of transcendence 
and that of the transcendence of traditional 
metaphysics is that Derrida aims to show the 
impossibility of transcendence.  It is in this 
sense that Simon Critchley can claim that 
Derrida’s notion of transcendence is in fact 
quasi-transcendence (Critchley 1996; 29). 
The impossibility of transcendental founda-
tion reveals itself through the interplay of 
oppositions when the same phenomenon ap-
pears as its opposition. Consequently, quasi-
transcendence in Derrida’s thought appears 
as something which is not beyond, but as 
something which is in-between. The in-be-
tween-ness of Derrida’s quasi-transcendence 
is apparent in the essay “Force of Law”. 
The central theme of the essay is the dis-
tinction between justice and law (droit). That 
is to say, law, no matter how perfect it may 
be, is not and cannot ever be the same as jus-
tice. An immediate reaction to someone who 
sharply distinguishes law and justice is a tra-
ditional warning that law separated from jus-
tice is always tyrannical. It is in this sense that 
classical contract theory, which argued that 
just laws ought to spring from the people’s 
consent, agrees that justice has to be enforced 
by the law. The word “enforcement”, how-
ever, implies that justice, as long as it is en-
forced through the law, always has something 
to do with force. According to Derrida, this is 
the very reason why justice has to be different 
from law. Justice should never have anything 
to do with violence. The distinction between 
justice and law is articulated by Derrida using 
the language of deconstruction: 
A deconstructive interpretation that starts, as 
was the case here, by destabilizing or complicating 
the opposition between nomos and physis (…) that 
is to say, the opposition between law, convention, 
the institution on the one hand, and nature on the 
other (Derrida 1996; 8). 
Deconstruction is the possibility of wid-
ening the understanding of different dis-
cursive phenomena by destabilizing their 
oppositions. In this sense, Derrida wants to 
provide a much wider interpretation of vio-
lence and law than traditional contract theo-
ry does. In his analysis of Walter Benjamin’s 
critical study on violence, Derrida emphasiz-
es that a critique of violence as such is pos-
sible only if we refuse to see violence in terms 
of means-ends logic (ibid; 31). All different 
traditional approaches have interpreted vio-
lence in terms of means and ends, thus a just 
end justifies chosen means and vice versa – 
just means make an end legitimate. In both 
cases, the same circle exists, which does not 
allow us to criticize violence as such. 
As long as they do not give themselves the 
theoretical or philosophical means to think the 
co-implication of violence and law, the usual 
critiques remain naïve and ineffectual. (…). Law 
(droit) in its very violence claims to recognize and 
defend said humanity as end, in the person of each 
individual. And so a purely moral critique of vio-
lence is as unjustified as it is impotent (…) because 
they [attacks against violence] remain alien to the 
juridical essence of violence (ibid; 41). 
Thus Derrida proposes to look at the phe-
nomenon of violence in conjunction with 
law rather than treat violence as something 
which lurks beyond law. Furthermore, Der-
rida conceptualizes it not merely in terms of 
direct physical force, but also in terms of ju-
 43
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2009/2(25), ISSN 1392-3358 Socialinė teorija
ridical-symbolic violence. Juridical-symbol-
ic, performative (or interpretative) violence 
is inscribed in the very essence of language. 
Referring to Blaise Pascal, Derrida mentions 
original sin. A possible interpretation of this 
can be that original sin originates not merely 
from the received knowledge of good and 
evil, but with the occurrence of logos itself, 
that is reason “that is corrupted by itself ” 
(ibid; 13). Reason functions through op-
positions, such as means/end, just/unjust, 
good/evil, rational/irrational, etc. If there is 
one side, there has to be another one as well. 
Consequently, good can only exist because 
of evil. Evil is the possibility of good. Good 
and evil are the consequences of logos, thus 
reasoning in the tradition of Western phi-
losophy always acclaims one side through 
the exclusion of the other. Any juridical-
symbolic discourse, which by its very nature 
tends to be universal, necessarily implies the 
exclusion of the other as something negative. 
This, according to Derrida, is the origin of 
violence. Thus, in as much as violence is in-
herently linked to reason as a source of any 
juridical-symbolic discourse, it cannot be 
something external to law. Derrida illustrates 
the thesis that violence is internal to the very 
logic of law through two examples. 
First of all, Derrida utilizes Georges Sorel’s 
conception of the general strike. According 
to Derrida, even if there is a legal right to 
strike, it does not mean that the strike is a 
non-violent form of resistance. The striking 
people manifest certain requirements and 
will not end their strike unless their claims 
have been satisfied. If their conditions are 
rejected, a revolutionary situation could ap-
pear as a result and thus “there is violence 
against violence” (ibid; 34). Secondly, Der-
rida uses the example from international af-
fairs arguing that war between two or more 
states is not external to international law. 
War always determines the conditions for 
peace; the end of war always brings forth an-
other set of laws. Finally, Derrida concludes 
that the foundation of law and its preserva-
tion are interchangeably linked as well. Usu-
ally there is a belief that only the preserva-
tion of the law – to protect and maintain 
the existing legal order through the use of le-
gitimate power – requires violence. Derrida 
claims the opposite; he suggests that there is 
no clear distinction, even between the Sore-
lian general strike to re-establish the state 
and Marx’s general proletarian strike which 
seeks to destroy the state  (ibid; 38). Both of 
them have to deal with negotiation and the 
establishment of another order which will 
then have to be preserved. Any founding act 
always calls for repetition. In a similar man-
ner, Friedrich Nietzsche shows that the will 
to power functions through the increase of 
its power. It requires overcoming itself and 
is in need of constant reinterpretation, refor-
mulation and re-foundation. Thus both in 
destruction-foundation of and its conserva-
tion-preservation there is intrinsic violence 
that can be criticized only by appealing to 
something beyond. 
If one accepts that violence is not some-
thing external to law but is its intrinsic 
characteristic; furthermore, if destruction 
and foundation, reformation and revolu-
tion, initiating and conserving are one and 
the same, then any political decision, any 
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constitutional reading, legal amendment or 
reform is always (1) a revolutionary and (2) 
a violent act. Here Derrida pauses. What 
interests him is the founding moment, the 
moment when a revolutionary and violent 
act is just about to arrive. Any performa-
tive act in its founding moment suspends 
existing juridical-symbolic discourse, thus 
it is neither legal nor illegal (ibid; 14). Fur-
thermore, it is violent not merely because 
it suspends all possible moral and juridi-
cal law, but because it is enforced. Derrida 
claims that this moment reveals itself in its 
un-decidability. The hopeless awareness that 
any decision (which is necessary to be taken 
and taken right now) is unavoidably violent 
discloses a situation involving aporia and 
madness. This is a mystical moment, a qua-
si-transcendental moment: in such a mo-
ment men find themselves beyond the law 
and morality, beyond reason and language 
and beyond the decision which is about to 
come. This is what Derrida calls the mystical 
foundation of authority. Every decision has 
to go through this aporia, because it is the 
only justification of any political authority or 
legal order. This moment of un-decidability 
is also the deepest source of all change – it 
is the primordial return to de-stabilization 
and thus it is inevitably the demand for new 
stabilization (Derrida 1996; 84). 
Derrida’s reading resembles another re-
markable story – Søren Kierkegaard’s inter-
pretation of the biblical story of Abraham 
scarifying his son. Although Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical narrative in Fear and Trem-
bling leads to different conclusions, there is 
an important similarity with Derrida’s un-
derstanding of law and justice. However, the 
resemblance of Derrida and Kierkengaard 
may seem tenuous, given that Derrida’s de-
construction of law does not seem to be as 
violent as is the case with the suspension of 
morality in Abraham’s decision to sacrifice 
his son. Does not Derrida claim directly the 
opposite, namely, that “deconstruction is 
justice” (Derrida 1992; 15)? That is to say, 
if deconstruction resembles Abraham’s act of 
sacrificial killing, how can it be seen in terms 
of justice? 
There are two key aspects to this issue. 
One of them reveals even deeper aporia in 
the nature of justice (Derrida himself ac-
knowledges this). The second is related to 
the interpretation of Kierkegaard’s reading of 
Abraham’s story. Fear and Trembling presents 
the biblical story of Abraham as a remark-
able example of unconditional faith. Accord-
ing to Kierkegaard, Abraham is the Knight 
of Faith because he has the strength to obey 
God’s will and sacrifice his beloved son. All 
his life, Abraham hopes to receive a son and 
God keeps his promise – Isaac is born to 
Abraham. According to Kierkegaard, this 
is the reason why Abraham is able to accept 
God’s new challenge to sacrifice his beloved 
son. He believed “on the strength of absurd 
(…) that the God who demanded this of 
him should in the next instant withdraw the 
demand” and, sure enough, Isaac is saved 
(Kierkegaard 1985; 65). Kierkegaard argues 
that Abraham’s obedience is best exemplified 
in the very act when Abraham stands with 
a knife in his hand above his helpless son. 
This act, similar to Derrida’s performative 
act, suspends ethics. It is in this sense that 
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Kierkegaard firmly concludes that absolute 
obedience and faith to God suspends ethics. 
I have argued that Kierkegaard’s read-
ing of the Old Testament story is mislead-
ing (Bielskis 2009). Kierkegaard emphasizes 
only the first part of the story that culminates 
in Abraham’s raising his hand to slaughter 
Isaac. An equally important part of the story 
is God stopping Abraham. An alternative 
reading of the story can be interpreted as 
follows. Abraham is willing to sacrifice his 
son only because he believes that God will 
save his son Isaac. Thus the very moment of 
sacrifice does not exist to Abraham. By do-
ing this, he is looking forward to the future 
expectation of loving his saved son. In this 
sense, love (agape) – the highest ethical vir-
tue – should precisely be linked to faith in 
a transcendent God. According to this read-
ing, ethics can be realized only through ab-
solute faith in God. 
If Abraham’s commitment to God does 
not suspend ethics, and if ethics exist as ab-
solutely individual, infinite and impossible 
to be fully reduced to and defined only in 
terms of universal law, then deconstruction 
is ethical as well.  Indeed, this is how Der-
rida himself sees deconstruction. Derrida has 
many times openly acknowledged his debt 
to Emmanuel Levinas (Derrida 1996, 1997, 
1999). Justice and ethics are very much un-
derstood in terms of Levinas’s responsibility 
for and hospitality to the other. Thus justice 
is the infinite responsibility to the other hu-
man being. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
shows how the other – the face of a concrete 
human being – begs a response and my re-
sponsibility, a responsibility that is infinite 
and metaphysical (Levinas 1991). Derrida 
paraphrases Levinas, saying that “I owe my-
self infinitely to each and every singularity” 
(Derrida 1996; 86). But if justice is some-
thing to do with an infinite and singular re-
sponsibility, then justice is not deconstructa-
ble, for it appears beyond language. 
This is the crucial point in Derrida’s argu-
ment. Justice as responsibility begins at this 
very moment of un-decidability explained 
above. That is to say, justice is inexperienced 
in a sense that it is not graspable and opens 
as a (quasi) experience of being beyond lan-
guage. Justice opens in aporia which finds 
itself caught between heterogeneous, incal-
culable and asymmetric sensitivity to the 
other and a stabilized and calculable “system 
of regulated and coded prescriptions” (Der-
rida 1992; 22). It is aporia between (1) infi-
nite responsibility and suspended rules and 
(2) the need to take a decision establishing a 
new law which could only be enforced. It is 
un-decidability between awareness that any 
performative act necessarily reduces irreduc-
ible hospitality and the need to act. Here 
Derrida differs from Heidegger, whose later 
apolitical writings do not imply the need for 
responsible action (White 1991). Decon-
struction always finds itself caught between 
justice and law, which claims to be enforced 
in the name of justice; it “calls for an increase 
in responsibility” (Derrida 1992; 16). But if 
justice is aporia and “exists” only in the mo-
ment of un-decidability, then justice opens 
as a promise, something that, as Derrida 
puts it, is yet-to-come. Furthermore, Derrida 
claims that democracy is also “yet-to-come”. 
Thus understood politics is an endless proc-
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ess – infinite responsibility encouraging us 
to act without the naive, optimistic belief 
that by this very act justice will somehow 
be reached. On the other hand, it cannot be 
seen as a pessimistic account when it emerges 
as a messianic promise, the belief that a more 
just order and deeper democracy will come.  
The critique of modern  
constitutionalism 
James Tully, a distinguished Canadian 
philosopher, has contributed enormously in 
shaping recent theoretical debates on mul-
ticulturalism (e.g. Laden et al 2007). James 
Tully has been especially influential in theo-
rizing the politics of the cultural recognition 
of indigenous peoples of North America 
and Australia. He convincingly argued that 
their political rights should be based on the 
claims for collective self-determination and 
partnership rather than subordination and 
assimilation. In his influential book, Strange 
Multiplicity, James Tully provides a powerful 
critique of modern constitutionalism vis-à-
vis demands for cultural recognition. Con-
sequently, put together Derrida and Tully 
provide powerful, albeit contrasting, philo-
sophical accounts of the politics of cultural 
difference and recognition.
Although James Tully does not accept 
Derrida’s language of deconstruction, he 
nonetheless pays significant attention to the 
issue of language. Strange Multiplicity pro-
vides a fundamental critique of the language 
of modern constitutionalism. One of his key 
arguments is that modern constitutionalism 
cannot accommodate vast cultural diversity 
because it has been constructed upon the 
idea of the uniform sovereignty of the state 
(Tully 1995). He points out that the tradition 
of modern constitutionalism was formed in 
opposition to ancient constitutionalism. 
In contrast to modern constitutional-
ism, ancient constitutionalism was shaped 
through a long historical process in which 
customs and traditional habits played an es-
sential role in forming the respective legal 
system. This meant that the foundation of 
law was rooted in customs and maintained 
continuity with the traditional custom-
shaped order. This was not the case with 
modern constitutionalism, since the mod-
ern state was established through the al-
leged uniformity of the sovereign people 
who saw themselves as equal and free. Here, 
Tully initially refers to the French Revolu-
tion which gave birth to the modern con-
stitutional tradition when a sovereign people 
established a uniform constitutional order 
imposed through centralized authority. The 
conception of the people as self-constituting 
law-givers implies that political community 
as such is no longer something natural and 
historical, a body which is formed through 
customs, traditions and culture, but is con-
stituted by an act of universal reason: 
At the centre of the picture are the sovereign 
people who exist prior to the constitution of 
a political association. By a self-conscious act 
of reflective reason and agreement, the people 
give rise to a constitution which ‘constitutes’ the 
political association. The constitution lays down 
the fundamental laws which establish the form of 
government, the rights and duties of citizens, the 
representative and institutional relation between 
government and governed, and an amending 
formula (Tully 1995; 59). 
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Modern constitutionalism does not mere-
ly exclude cultural traditions, but is rather 
based on the idea that custom, tradition and 
culture have to be constituted by self-deter-
mining reason, that is to say, customs and 
cultural differences have their “authority only 
in virtue of [their] recognition by the sover-
eign, not vice versa” (ibid; 67). This implies 
that either culture is irrelevant to the political 
constitution of the state or that the state is 
culturally homogeneous. The latter was cer-
tainly the case as far as a great deal of modern 
political theorists was concerned. 
For theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, Immanuel Kant and more re-
cently John Rawls, culture and cultural tra-
ditions are secondary at best. For Locke, for 
example, men are equal and free in the state 
of nature; their cultural differences are irrel-
evant vis-à-vis individuals’ ability to live to-
gether. The emphasis on uniformity and the 
exclusion of cultural differences are also evi-
dent in Kant’s moral and political philoso-
phy. The dignity of man lies in his/her ability 
to act according to universal law established 
by a priori reason. This, according to Kant, is 
the source of autonomy and freedom. Thus 
if one acts in accordance with cultural tradi-
tions or customs, something which does not 
conform to the universality of moral law, then 
such an act is neither autonomous and nor 
fully free. In the name of abstract rationality 
imposed through people’s consent, modern 
constitutionalism tends to melt and assimi-
late cultural differences into the homogene-
ous and uniform state.  Furthermore, Tully 
spells out another important feature of mod-
ern constitutionalism – its belief that it is the 
best form of political order and thus superior 
to the old forms of constitutionalism. This, 
of course, had something to do with the En-
lightenment’s hubris and its naïve belief in 
progress. Observing other cultural-political 
traditions as if they were inferior to modern 
constitutionalism, appealing to and utilizing 
Locke’s arguments legitimized the colonial 
domination of indigenous people in North 
America and Australia. 
The issue of identity is another similar-
ity which brings Tully and Derrida closer to-
gether. Modern political thought has tended 
to conceptualize entities (whether individual 
or collective, whether national or local) in 
terms of fixed identities and substance rath-
er than process and relation (Young 1990; 
98). Identity here is understood in essen-
tialist terms and as constituting something 
stable. Tully, following Derrida, Iris Mar-
ion Young and other critics of the logic of 
identity, argues that we have to understand 
social and cultural entities through the no-
tions of otherness and difference which are 
always internal to every culture (Tully 1995; 
13). Cultural and national identities have no 
fixed meaning and are not formed once and 
for all. Rather they are “aspectival”, that is 
identities and “cultural horizon change as 
one moves about just like natural horizon’” 
(ibid.). Nonetheless, there is a difference 
between Derrida and Tully. Tully does not 
conceptualize language as something which 
must be overcome; nor does he suggest that 
there is a need for us to experience quasi-
transcendence beyond language (or due to 
the suspension of language). Drawing on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy, 
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Tully argues that language itself is multiform 
and aspectival. He illustrates this with Witt-
genstein’s metaphor about an ancient town. 
Language is like an ancient town where 
there are different houses from various his-
torical periods and where winding old streets 
and squares are surrounded by newer straight 
streets and uniform houses. Thus, accord-
ing to Tully, there is no need for the radical 
revolutionary criticism of language as such, 
because diversity can be rediscovered in lan-
guage as an aspectival phenomenon. This is 
the case with the language of constitutional-
ism as well – even within modern constitu-
tionalism it is possible to discover diversity or, 
as Tully calls it, hidden constitutions. Here 
Tully quotes Wittgenstein’s fragment which 
resemblance Derrida’s approach: “[we] do not 
command a clear view of the use of our words’ 
<...> because language ‘is lacking in this sort 
of perspicuity” (cf. Tully 1995; 104). Thus 
Tully argues that in language itself we find, to 
use Derrida’s terms, the moment of un-decid-
ability. Of course Derrida’s “un-decidability” 
and Wittgenstein’s “lack of perspicuity” are 
not the same, but they share one important 
similarity – both of them are the source of di-
versity, including cultural diversity. 
But if language is multiform, how is gen-
erality possible? Here Tully uses Wittgen-
stein’s thought again. Generality is a practice 
which is actualized through customs (Witt-
genstein 1974: 81). There is no general rule 
or term unless it is embodied through use 
and practice. Thus the general rule is not 
something which is comprehensive; gener-
alizations are not constructed upon uniform 
general meaning. Language is like a laby-
rinth; it always has many confusing paths 
and lacks perspicuity. Rules do not deter-
mine behaviour. Wittgenstein illustrates this 
with his famous example of a sign-post: a 
sign-post does not determine where we have 
to go; it can lead us to many possibilities as 
far as how and where to go. Tully, following 
Wittgenstein, concludes that the general rule 
gets embodied in practical activity which 
requires technique and mastery as well as 
creates intersubjectivity. Wittgenstein’s “lan-
guage game” enables Tully to interpret the 
discourse of constitutionalism as a game. 
A game is possible only if it has a particu-
lar set of rules that can only come through 
practice. To play the game does not mean to 
blindly accept the rules of the game, but to 
use them. It is in this sense that game playing 
enables intersubjectivity – people engage in 
dialogue and learn from one another. How-
ever, as long there are many possible paths 
and practices, participants play and create 
the rules of the game as they go along (ibid; 
39). Consequently, the best language user is 
the one who is able to use and create rules in 
as many different scenarios as possible. This, 
however, is possible only through engage-
ment in dialogue – “to understand a general 
term (…) it is always necessary to enter into 
dialogue with interlocutors from other re-
gions of the city, to listen to their ‘further 
description” (Tully 1995; 110). 
Tully’s utilization of Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy of language helps us to see constitu-
tionalism as a multiform phenomenon. Al-
though Tully is critical towards modern con-
stitutionalism, he proclaims that uniformity 
is not the only form of contemporary consti-
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tutionalism. In his work, Tully also tries to 
rediscover diversity and the elements of the 
politics of cultural recognition in contempo-
rary constitutionalism. He provides a clear 
distinction between his approach and the 
philosophy of contemporary political think-
ers such as Rawls and Habermas. Social real-
ity is too heterogeneous and complex; thus 
in order to accommodate cultural diversity 
it is not enough (as it is the case in Rawls 
and in Habermas) to establish an agreement 
on the basis of thin universal second-order 
principles (Ivison 1997; 20). Rather than ap-
pealing to these second-order universal prin-
ciples, Tully proposes three conventions of 
common constitutionalism instead: mutual 
recognition, continuity and consent. What 
Tully argues is that in order to be just and 
able to achieve compromise between cul-
turally different negotiators, all participants 
should get rid of their allegedly universal and 
totalising principles which each party tries to 
impose on the others. Language as a multi-
form phenomenon discloses the perspective 
of irreducible diversity, which implies that 
communication is possible only through 
critical dialogue. The correct attitude then 
is the willingness to exchange alternative de-
scriptions and values without attempting to 
comprehend what the other party says with-
in one’s own language (Tully 1995; 111). 
The three conventions therefore are 
based on the willingness to listen and alter 
one’s own position. The first step is mutual 
recognition. People and their representa-
tives, participating in a negotiation, have 
to recognize each other’s ways of seeing and 
articulating the world. They have to see 
“cross-cultural resemblance” by mutually re-
specting their culturally different languages. 
Tully provides an example from European 
history: the indigenous people of North 
America and the British Crown, which was 
representing its North American colonies, 
accommodated and treated each other as 
equal and self-governing nations. However, 
mutual recognition is not enough, as it has 
to be maintained on the daily basis. The con-
vention of continuity is based on the respect 
of customs and traditions of self-governing 
people. Only then can negotiators reach just 
consent. It is important to point out that 
consent here should be seen as an ongoing 
process. It is a practical dialogue which ena-
bles cross-cultural understanding between 
the different people participating in nego-
tiation. Furthermore, Tully claims that “[w]
e need the dialogue itself to become aware 
of all aspects of our association that ought 
to be recognised and accommodated in the 
constitution” (ibid; 133). 
What kind of spirit – ethos – does the 
politics of cultural recognition require? Tully 
suggests that a good example of the ethos is 
captured in the Canadian artist Bill Reid’s 
sculpture “The spirit of Haida Gwaii”. This 
sculpture is a fragment from the mythology 
of Haida, an indigenous culture native to the 
Pacific Northwest Coast of North America. 
It portrays a canoe with thirteen passengers 
peddling in the same direction. The passen-
gers are all different, rather strange creatures 
– spirits – who are able to coexist peacefully 
together without violating each others’ dif-
ferences. It illustrates “the spirit of a post-im-
perial age of cultural diversity” and serves as 
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a symbol for mutual recognition (ibid; 17). 
If our world is like a small canoe, inhabited 
by people from different cultures and tradi-
tions, then the only way to live is by listen-
ing to each other. The willingness to listen 
opens “endless perspective and interrelations 
awaken the play of my imagination from its 
dogmatic slumber” and an unlimited sense 
of wonder is evoked (ibid; 22). This expe-
rience, Tully argues, is mystical. It is mysti-
cal not in the sense of personal experience 
or personal morality. Rather, the spirit of 
listening is a civil ethos for it awakens our 
civic ability to see the social world from a 
multitude of viewpoints. Thus the spirit of 
Haida Gwaii (it simply means the spirit of 
the home) is the spirit of listening. Without 
this spirit, any critical and constructive dia-
logue necessary for the recognition and po-
litical accommodation of cultural diversity 
will never be possible. 
conclusions: Some critical Questions
At this point, it is important to draw 
some conclusive as well as comparative re-
marks about the two approaches to multi-
culturalism. James Tully constructs his texts 
from the point of view of the politics of cul-
tural recognition. His work is written from 
the perspective of excluded and marginalized 
indigenous peoples. Consequently, the main 
question he raises throughout his works is 
how the recognition of minority cultures is 
possible within the political and legal frame-
work of liberal modernity. Will Tully’s sug-
gested politics of cultural recognition work 
in ethnic conflicts such as Palestine, Rwanda 
or Kashmir? Would it be possible to realize 
the spirit of Haid, as Tully puts it, in any 
other regions of radical conflict? Of course 
there can hardly be any straightforward 
answers to these questions. James Tully fre-
quently references some of these radical con-
flicts, but he does not provide a satisfactory 
theoretical answer for resolving them. He 
claims that multicultural constitutionalism 
and the spirit of listening are the only solu-
tions if people want to live in peace. With-
out a doubt, he is right. However, looking at 
it more realistically, the question we need to 
pose is the following:  Will it ever be possible 
to solve such conflicts without some form 
of exclusion and marginalization of existing 
cultures or the cultural and political claims 
of one side at the expense of the other? The 
politics of radical conflict (or politics in gen-
eral) require us to decide and these decisions 
have to be taken now. 
This is where Jacques Derrida’s decon-
struction and his critique of language become 
important: there will always be political de-
cisions which will exclude, marginalize and 
be unjust to different groups and peoples. 
Of course, it does not mean that we have 
to accept this injustice. Rather, Derrida’s 
interpretation of justice and the politics of 
recognition which he has intimately linked 
to deconstruction remind us that justice and 
the politics of true non-tribal friendship have 
yet to come (Derrida 1997). Thus the ten-
sion between the ethos of listening and the 
concrete decision as nomos will always exist. 
Tully does not refer enough to this conflict 
and this explains why his political theory is 
too optimistic. On the other hand, Derrida’s 
position, which states that any decision is 
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revolutionary and can never be called just 
even in the sense of the possibility to solve 
concrete problems, may seem too obscure, 
too theoretical and even pretentious. Thus 
the question we need to pose to the follow-
ers of Derrida is the following: What is the 
practical usefulness of his theory of decon-
struction within our daily political struggles 
for emancipation, recognition and freedom? 
Needless to say, this question is not posed 
in the banal way that doubts (wrongly!) the 
significance of serious theory for political 
praxis. It is in this sense Noam Chomsky’s 
critique of Derrida is significant: Chomsky 
rightly raises the issue of unnecessary ob-
scurity when putting across Derrida’s simple 
ideas (Chomsky 1995). 
Yet both Derrida and Tully provide im-
portant theoretical insights in understand-
ing multiculturalism; both of them postu-
late the fundamental tension between the 
nomos of modern liberal democracies and 
the increasing need to recognise cultural, 
sexual diversity and irreducible heterogene-
ity. This tension illustrates their historical, 
ethical and theoretical sensitivity which is 
necessary in our pursuit of making sense of 
the world.  Furthermore, both of them see 
politics as an ongoing process whereby the 
people engaged in it have to appeal to their 
responsibility and individual insight rather 
than dogmatic universal and essentialist 
principles. Tully believes that if we are able 
to enter into a critical dialogue and accom-
modate the ethos of listening, violence can be 
almost completely avoided. Hence implicitly 
in the end ethos and nomos can be seen as one 
and the same. Derrida insists that justice and 
democracy as promises to be fulfilled require 
engagement as well – politics is the proc-
ess which requires justice to become nomos. 
This is the main similarity and is simultane-
ously the chief difference: for Tully violence 
is minimised through the ethos of listening 
and dialogue, while for Derrida even if nomos 
becomes less violent, ethos will always remain 
imposed and secured through law. This dif-
ference is due to their different approaches 
to the limits of a cognitive-linguistic act of 
human understanding. James Tully believes 
that culturally different views can be under-
stood, thus his theory of multiculturalism is 
based on listening, communicating and un-
derstanding. Jacques Derrida does not accept 
such a theoretical stance. Applying Levinas’s 
notion of ethical responsibility, he suggests 
that to be just – to welcome the singularity 
of a concrete human being – is possible not 
through understanding her, but by respond-
ing to her, by offering unconditional hospi-
tality. They both would agree that this is an 
infinite process.   
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abStract  
muLtIcuLturaLISm anD the poLItIcS of recognItIon:  
JacQueS DerrIDa anD JameS tuLLy
This essay critically engages Jacques Derrida’s and James Tully’s theoretical conceptualizations of multi-
culturalism and the politics of recognition. It analyzes the possibilities of using deconstruction when reflect-
ing the nature of law and violence as well as how an aporia, revealed by deconstruction, provides us with 
an alternate understanding of the politics of recognition. James Tully’s Wittgensteinian critique of modern 
constitutionalism is analysed in the context of (and compared to) Derrida’s deconstruction of law, showing 
that both social theorists understand multiculturalism and the politics of recognition as an ongoing and 
open-ended process.
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